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Assessing Control Risk: Effects  of  Procedural 
Differences  on Auditor Consensus* 
Jane E. Morton 
William L. Felix, Jr. 
University of  Arizona 
ABSTRACT 
In 1988, Statement on Auditing Standards Number 55, "Consideration of 
the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit", was issued by 
the AICPA as a replacement standard for  AU Section 320, "The Auditor's Study 
and Evaluation of  Internal Control", in an attempt to improve auditors' con-
trol risk assessments. This paper describes the conceptual differences  be-
tween the old and new standards with respect to control risk assessment. In 
addition, results are presented for  an experiment in which practicing audi-
tors are asked to assess control risk following  one of  two risk assessment pro-
cedures based on the two approaches suggested by the old and new standards. 
These tentative results, based on small sample sizes, do not indicate a clear 
"winner" in terms of  consensus, however it appears that a procedural effect 
is present. 
1. Introduction 
Early in 1990, the auditor's responsibility for  the evaluation and testing 
of  a client's internal control structure was altered when Statement on Audit-
ing Standards No. 55 (SAS 55), "Consideration of  the Internal Control Struc-
ture in a Financial Statement Audit", became effective.  According to Temkin 
and Winters [1988, pp. 98], "It's objective is to enhance audit effectiveness 
by improving audit planning and sharpening the auditor's assessments of  con-
trol risk." 
The new standard however, is not simply an attempt at integration of  the 
old AU Section 320, "The Auditor's Study and Evaluation of  Internal Control", 
and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47 (SAS 47), "Audit Risk and Ma-
teriality in Conducting an Audit." Significant  changes also appear to have been 
made in the basic concepts underlying the old standards.1 Consequently, a 
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful  comments of  Bill Waller. 
1The conceptual changes in SAS 55, described in the next section of  this paper, resulted in a 
number of  changes to other professional  standards (including SAS 47.) Throughout the paper, 
we use AICPA Professional  Standards,  Volume 1 (June, 1987) to reflect  pre-SAS 55 standards. 
We refer  to these as the "old standards". 
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primary focus  of  the new standard is the introduction and discussion of  the 
procedure for  assessing control risk within the context of  these changes. 
Presumably, following  the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk 
should result in "better" control risk assessments than those made under the 
old standards. Unfortunately,  precise measurement of  the extent of  improve-
ment that such a procedure might provide is problematic. The development 
of  a reasonably specific  normative model which could be applied across all 
firms  to determine what the control risk assessment SHOULD be would be 
difficult  due to the complexity of  the internal control structure and differ-
ences in this structure across audit clients. Furthermore, ex-post determina-
tion that the control risk assessment was appropriate is not often  feasible  due 
to the lack of  any clear link between control risk assessments and observable 
outcomes. However, if  the purpose of  professional  standards is to provide uni-
form  guidance to auditors, then we should expect that application of  the SAS 
55 procedure for  assessing control risk by many auditors in the SAME audit 
situation would result in a greater degree of  consensus among auditors than 
there would be in the absence of  such a procedure, for  reasons discussed below. 
Einhorn [1974] points out that agreement (i.e., consensus) can be thought 
of  in two ways: (a) agreement "in fact"  and (b) agreement "in principle." In 
the context of  assessing control risk, agreement in principle implies that au-
ditors have a common understanding of  the control risk assessment process, 
including the type of  evidence to be collected, how that evidence should be 
weighted and combined to arrive at an assessed level of  control risk, and the 
role of  the control risk assessment in planning the audit. Agreement in fact, 
on the other hand, refers  to agreement on the actual control risk assessments. 
One goal of  professional  standards for  auditors, implicitly, is to achieve 
a higher degree of  agreement in principle than would be achieved in the ab-
sence of  standards. Consequently, if  this goal is achieved for  a given stan-
dard then, ceteris paribus, we should expect to see greater agreement in fact 
among auditors than there would be in the absence of  such a standard.2 The 
term "consensus", as used in this paper, refers  to the degree of  agreement 
in fact. 
The use of  consensus as a measure for  decision quality has received sup-
port in auditing research [see, for  example, R. Ashton, 1983, and A Ashton, 
1985]. It is important to recognize that a high degree of  consensus does not 
necessarily imply accuracy. The "correct" decision at each stage in an audit 
is not generally known. Indeed, the identification  of  "incorrect" decisions can 
often  only be made well after  the fact  in the event of  an audit failure,  if  at all. 
However, the successful  defense  of  auditor decisions in the event of  litiga-
tion often  involves establishing a consensus, via expert witnesses, that the 
auditor acted in a prudent manner [Joyce and Libby, 1982]. This argument 
seems a particularly appropriate reason for  using consensus to measure and 
compare the "quality" of  control risk assessments made using the SAS 55 pro-
cedure with other procedures since SAS 55 is one of  eight new standards is-
2It should be noted that auditors at large firms  see the professional  standards through the fil-
ter of  the firm  audit manual, workpapers, etc. This filter  affects  consensus to the extent that 
there are differences  in this filter  across firms. 
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sued by the AICPA in response to SEC and congressional criticism stemming 
largely from  recent cases of  auditor litigation.3 
The purpose of  this paper is to describe the conceptual differences  be-
tween the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk and the procedure sug-
gested by the old standards.4 In addition, we provide preliminary evidence 
on the effects  that such procedural differences  might have on the degree of 
auditor consensus. The results of  this study are intended to provide insights 
for  future,  more refined  experiments. We conduct an experiment in which 
practicing auditors are given information  relating to a hypothetical client's 
internal control structure elements and are asked to assess control risk on a 
qualitative scale (ranging from  "lowest" to "highest"). Half  of  the subjects re-
ceive a description of  a control risk assessment procedure based on our in-
terpretation of  SAS 55 and are asked to follow  this procedure in making their 
assessment. The remaining subjects receive a description of  an alternative 
procedure based on concepts implicit in the old standards (described in the 
next section of  this paper). Consensus is measured by converting qualitative 
responses into a simple quantitative scale and computing the standard devi-
ation of  each group's responses. 
A potential confounding  factor  which may limit the usefulness  of  our re-
sults is the inability to completely control for  differences  in firm  policy with 
regard to control risk assessments and/or the extent to which different  firms 
have already adopted methods which are congruent with SAS 55. For example, 
although auditor subjects are asked to follow  the specific  procedure for  as-
sessing control risk that is described in their questionnaire, their responses 
may nevertheless be unintentionally biased toward control risk assessments 
which reflect  elements of  their firms'  policies. We attempt to control for 
these effects  by stressing to subjects the importance of  following  the described 
control risk assessment procedure regardless of  how it may differ  from  their 
firm's  policy. However, even if  we are successful  in our attempt to motivate 
(conscious) unbiased responses, it is unlikely that (unconscious) firm  bias 
can be completely eliminated. 
The results of  this experiment have implications for  auditors' assessments 
of  control risk in practice. If  the procedure used to assess control risk has a 
significant  effect  on auditors' control risk assessments, then great care should 
be taken in recognizing and considering these effects  in order to determine 
the most appropriate procedure to follow.  In particular, if  a prescribed procedure 
contains equivocalities with respect to the role of  evidence in assessing con-
trol risk or with respect to the meaning of  the assessment itself,  then low con-
sensus may be an indication that control risk assessment is not necessarily 
recognized as the same task across auditors. In other words, a prescribed pro-
cedure which fails  to achieve agreement in principle is likely to result in low 
3See "Official  Releases", Journal of  Accountancy (July, 1988), pp. 144. 
4While the sequence of  events (i.e., obtaining an understanding of  internal controls, collection 
of  evidence, etc.) does not differ  between the old and new standards, what does differ  is the au-
ditor's internal process (i.e., how the information  collected is used to assess control risk). We 
use the term "procedure" to refer  to the particular way in which judgments are made with re-
spect to control risk. 
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consensus. Consequently, using a procedure which results in low consensus 
among auditors may result in a more difficult  defense  in the event of  litigation 
where there is disagreement among expert witnesses. 
The remainder of  this paper is organized as follows.  The next section de-
scribes the SAS 55 procedure for  assessing control risk and discusses the 
conceptual differences  between it and the procedure suggested by the old 
standards. The third section describes the experiment and discusses possi-
ble results. The fourth  section presents the results and the final  section pro-
vides concluding remarks and suggestions for  further  research. 
2. SAS 55 Control Risk Assessment Procedure 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 55 (SAS 55), "Consideration of  the 
Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit", alters the audi-
tor's responsibility for  the evaluation and testing of  a client's internal control 
structure. In particular, SAS 55 expands the scope of  the evaluation and 
specifically  identifies  the type of  knowledge needed to obtain a sufficient  un-
derstanding of  a client's internal control structure and the degree of  knowl-
edge needed to plan the audit. The bulk of  the new standard, however, 
focuses  on the auditor's responsibility for  assessing control risk and de-
scribes the procedure to be followed  in making this assessment. A brief  de-
scription of  this procedure follows. 
Prior to assessing control risk, the auditor is required to obtain a suffi-
cient understanding of  the client's internal control structure to plan the audit. 
The internal control structure consists of  the following  elements [Paragraph 
8]: 1) The control environment, 2) The accounting system, and 3) Control 
procedures. 
After  obtaining an understanding of  the internal control structure, the au-
ditor begins the process of  assessing control risk. This process is described 
in SAS 55, Paragraphs 29 and 30, as follows: 
29. Assessing control risk is the process of  evaluating the effec-
tiveness of  an entity's internal control structure policies and procedures 
in preventing or detecting material misstatements in the financial 
statements. Control risk should be assessed in terms of  financial  state-
ment assertions. After  obtaining the understanding of  the internal 
control structure, the auditor may assess control risk at the maximum 
level for  some or all assertions because he believes policies and pro-
cedures are unlikely to pertain to an assertion, are unlikely to be ef-
fective,  or because evaluating their effectiveness  would be inefficient. 
30. Assessing control risk at below the maximum level involves: 
• Identifying  specific  internal control structure policies and procedures 
relevant to specific  assertions that are likely to prevent or detect ma-
terial misstatements in those assertions. 
• Performing  tests of  controls to evaluate the effectiveness  of  such 
policies and procedures. 
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In effect,  the assessed level of  control risk is that level that is supported 
by evidential matter obtained from  evaluating the effectiveness  of  operating 
internal control structure policies and procedures. It follows  then, that after 
obtaining an understanding of  the internal control structure but prior to per-
forming  any tests of  controls (assuming, for  illustration purposes, that no tests 
of  controls were performed  during the course of  obtaining the understand-
ing), the control risk assessment should be at the maximum level. As tests 
of  controls are performed  and evidential matter is collected which confirms 
the effectiveness  of  internal control structure policies and procedures, the 
control risk assessment is reduced. Consequently, the greater the extent of 
testing, the greater the potential reduction in the assessed level of  control 
risk from  the maximum level. 
Ultimately, after  all testing has been completed, the final  (evidence-sup-
ported) assessed level of  control risk is used, along with the assessed level 
of  inherent risk, to determine the acceptable level of  detection risk for  the 
purpose of  determining the nature, timing, and extent of  substantive tests to 
perform. 5. It would seem then, that a primary motivation for  the SAS 55 pro-
cedure for  assessing control risk is to ensure that this necessary input to the 
Audit Risk Model6 is properly supported by evidential matter. 
While SAS 55 attempts to make a positive move toward greater consis-
tency with other standards, some significant  changes in the basic concepts 
underlying the old standards are implicit in the control risk assessment pro-
cedure as it is described in SAS 55. In paragraph 28 of  SAS 55, control risk 
is defined  as "the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an as-
sertion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity's in-
ternal control structure policies or procedures." However, the assessment of 
control risk based solely on the quantity (and quality) of  evidential matter 
collected is inconsistent with this definition.  The auditor's control risk as-
sessment should be, and is defined  as, a representation of  his beliefs  regarding 
the risk of  a material error7 getting through the client's internal controls, but 
these beliefs  are ignored under some conditions in the SAS 55 control risk 
assessment procedure. Consider the following  examples. 
Suppose that we're conducting two audits. After  obtaining an under-
standing of  each client's internal control structure, control risk is assessed 
at the maximum level for  both. For the first  client, control risk is assessed at 
the maximum level because the auditor believes there are material weaknesses 
in the entity's internal control structure. For the second client, the auditor 
believes the internal control structure is strong but has assessed control risk 
at the maximum level because performing  tests of  controls would be ineffi-
5SAS 55'S expansion of  factors  to be considered in obtaining an understanding of  a client's in-
ternal control structure may lead to increased confounding  of  the inherent risk and control risk 
assessments. This issue (albeit critical) is beyond the scope of  this paper. See Waller [1990] 
for  an analysis of  this confounding. 
6See the Appendix of  "Audit Sampling", AICPA Professional  Standards  - Volume 1 (AICPA, 
1987), AU Section 350. 
7We use the terms "error" and "misstatement" interchangeably. 
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cient.8 In the first  case, the auditor has identified  areas of  weakness in the 
client's internal control structure and should direct additional audit effort  to 
searching for  material error where he believes the risk of  error is high. In 
the second case, however, no material weaknesses in the internal control struc-
ture have been identified  by the auditor. The course of  action indicated in 
this case may be quite different  than the first,  yet because the assessed level 
of  control risk is the same for  both cases, this suggests that the nature, tim-
ing, and extent of  substantive testing would not differ  between the two.9 
The maximum assessed level of  control risk does not have the same 
meaning between the two cases. In the first  case, the assessed level of  con-
trol risk is, as defined  in SAS 47, a reflection  of  the auditor's beliefs  regard-
ing the risk of  material error getting through the client's internal control 
structure. In the second case, however, the auditor's beliefs  are not reflected 
at all. The assessed level of  control risk is arbitrarily set for  the purpose of 
planning the audit. It would seem, however, that a key factor  in audit plan-
ning would be the auditor's actual expectations regarding material error, yet 
these expectations are not reflected  in the control risk assessment in the sec-
ond case. 
To illustrate further,  suppose that after  obtaining an understanding of  a 
client's internal control structure, the auditor believes that there is a low prob-
ability that a material error will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis 
by internal control policies and procedures, i.e., he believes control risk is 
low. The auditor's expectations regarding material error in the financial  state-
ments are developed during the course of  obtaining the understanding and 
should be used as the basis for  planning the audit. 
The auditor can follow  a number of  alternative avenues for  the collection 
of  audit evidence. These may include performing  extensive tests of  controls 
and limited substantive tests; few,  if  any, formal  tests of  controls and expanded 
substantive tests; or any combination which the auditor believes will provide 
sufficient  evidential matter to support an opinion on the financial  statements. 
The choice among alternatives would be based in large part on the differen-
tial costs of  the various avenues, but the auditor's beliefs  regarding control 
risk should be used constructively regardless of  which avenue is chosen. Con-
sequently, if  the auditor chooses not to perform  tests of  controls due solely 
to cost considerations, a control risk assessment at the maximum level in-
correctly implies that he believes the risk of  error is high simply because per-
forming  tests of  controls would be inefficient.  This reasoning is contrary to 
the very concept and definition  of  control risk. 
In all fairness  to the drafters  of  SAS 55, this criticism is really a joint crit-
icism of  the SAS 55 control risk assessment process AND the Audit Risk Model 
8Although this option is stated in paragraph 29 of  SAS 55, it seems likely that some tests of  con-
trols would have to be performed  in order to obtain a sufficient  understanding of  a client's in-
ternal control structure. 
9Although this issue is an empirical one, it seems likely that, at least in some circumstances, al-
lowable detection risk and choice of  audit procedures would vary between the two cases described 
in this scenario. This possibility is explicitly recognized in paragraph 3.5 of  the audit guide for 
SAS 55 (AICPA, 1990). This situation may be due in part to a blurring of  the distinction between 
inherent risk and control risk. 
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(ARM). The shortcomings of  the ARM are well-documented [see, for  example, 
Cushing and Loebbecke, 1983, and Kinney, 1989]. In particular, the ARM does 
not accommodate both the auditor's beliefs  and an assessment of  the suffi-
ciency of  evidence to support those beliefs.  SAS 55 attempts to reconcile the 
two by prescribing a procedure for  assessing control risk based on a suffi-
ciency of  evidence criterion, however in many cases (as illustrated above) 
this method will not adequately reflect  the auditor's actual expectations and 
consequently, will, at least as described, ignore potentially valuable information. 
Ideally, a risk model should accommodate separate assessments of  risk and 
evidence sufficiency  [see Waller and Felix, 1984, for  an example of  the rudi-
ments of  such a model.] This concept has also been suggested by Loebbecke, 
Eining, and Willingham [1989] with respect to auditor's assessments of  the 
likelihood of  material management fraud.  They state, for  example; "[I]n ad-
dition to searching for  information  to support the assessment about each com-
ponent, the auditor must make a judgment about the thoroughness and 
reliability of  his/her procedures" [page 4]. 
Although professional  standards do not explicitly "model" separate belief 
assessments and evidence sufficiency  assessments, this basic concept was 
nevertheless reflected  in the old standards,10 as illustrated below. 
The first  standard of  reporting states: "The report shall state whether the 
financial  statements are presented in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." According to AU Section 312, "Audit Risk and Materi-
ality in Conducting an Audit," paragraph 3: 
The phrase 'present fairly  in conformity  with generally accepted ac-
counting principles' implicitly indicates the auditor's belief  that  the fi-
nancial statements taken as a whole are not materially misstated 
(emphasis added.) 
Indeed, the opinion rendered by an auditor on a client's financial  state-
ments is a direct reflection  of  his beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error 
in the financial  statements. Consequently, an auditor will issue an unquali-
fied  audit opinion only if  he believes that the risk of  undetected material error 
in the financial  statements is sufficiently  low. The risk of  undetected mate-
rial error in a client's financial  statements at the conclusion of  an audit is the 
familiar  "Audit Risk" discussed in AU Section 312. However, an auditor's as-
sessment of  his beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error is an important 
consideration not only at the conclusion of  an audit, but throughout the audit 
process. Clearly, the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error is 
an important consideration in planning the audit as well. AU Section 312, para-
graph 8, states: 
The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) 
planning the audit and designing auditing procedures and (b) evalu-
ating whether the financial  statements taken as a whole are presented 
fairly  in conformity  with generally accepted accounting principles. 
1 0 In the following  analysis, we use AICPA Professional  Standards, Volume 1 (June, 1987) to re-
flect  pre-SAS 55 (old) standards. 
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At the individual account-balance level, this guidance suggests that if  the 
auditor believes the risk of  material error in a particular account is high, this 
belief  should be reflected  in his choice of  audit procedures to perform  with 
respect to that account. Indeed, AU Section 312, paragraph 19, makes this 
explicit: 
The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-bal-
ance or class-of-transactions  level because such consideration directly 
assists him in determining the scope of  auditing procedures for  the 
balance or class. 
The decomposition of  audit risk into three component risks (i.e., inher-
ent risk, control risk, and detection risk) is an explicit reflection  of  the fact 
that the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  material error are an impor-
tant consideration throughout the audit process. Furthermore, these beliefs 
affect,  and in turn are affected  by, the auditing procedures performed  at var-
ious stages in the audit. 
For example, at the conclusion of  an audit, an undetected material error 
in a client's financial  statements indicates that (1) a material error occurred, 
(2) it was not detected by the client's internal control structure, and (3) it was 
not detected by the auditor. Consequently, the auditor's belief  regarding the 
risk of  undetected material error at the conclusion of  the audit will depend 
on his beliefs  regarding the likelihood of  the occurrence of  (1) through (3). 
These "component beliefs"  are sequentially addressed at different  stages in 
the audit process. Furthermore, because the auditor's beliefs  are an integral 
part of  the planning process, the auditor's beliefs  regarding the risk of  ma-
terial error after,  say, evaluating the client's internal control structure (i.e., 
after  assessing inherent risk and control risk) affect  the choice of  audit pro-
cedures in the substantive testing stage of  the audit which in turn affects  the 
likelihood of  (3). 
What then is the role of  audit evidence in the formation  of  the auditor's 
beliefs,  that is, on his assessments of  these component risks? Prior to SAS 
55, the second and third standards of  field  work stated: 
Second  Standard:  There is to be a proper study and evaluation of  the 
existing internal control as a basis for  reliance thereon and for  the de-
termination of  the resultant extent of  the tests to which auditing pro-
cedures are to be restricted. 
Third  Standard:  Sufficient  competent evidential matter is to be obtained 
through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations  to afford 
a reasonable basis for  an opinion regarding the financial  statements 
under examination. 
Thus, although an unqualified  opinion on a client's financial  statements 
necessarily reflects  the auditor's belief  that audit risk is acceptably low, this 
belief  alone is not enough to justify  the opinion. The standards of  field  work 
require that the auditor collect sufficient  competent evidential matter to sup-
port his opinion. Sufficient  evidential matter may be obtained through any 
combination of  tests of  controls evidence and substantive testing evidence 
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that, in the auditor's professional  judgment, meets this requirement. For ex-
ample, AU Section 350, "Audit Sampling", paragraph 19, states: 
The second standard of  field  work recognizes that the extent of  sub-
stantive tests required to obtain sufficient  evidential matter under the 
third standard should vary inversely with the auditor's reliance on in-
ternal accounting control. These standards taken together imply that 
the combination of  the auditor's reliance on internal accounting con-
trol and his reliance on his substantive tests should provide a reasonable 
basis for  his opinion, although the portion of  reliance derived from  the 
respective sources may vary. 
Under the old standards, the sufficiency  of  evidence assessment is reflected 
in the degree of  reliance placed on the respective sources of  evidential mat-
ter. At the conclusion of  the audit, then, the combination of  the evidence col-
lected should provide the auditor with the required basis for  reliance on his 
beliefs  regarding the risk of  undetected error in the financial  statements and 
in turn, on the opinion rendered. This concept of  reliance is further  linked 
explicitly to the auditor's component risk assessments. For example, AU 
Section 312, paragraph 24, states: 
The auditor might make separate or combined assessments of  in-
herent risk and control risk. If  he considers inherent risk or control 
risk, separately or in combination, to be less than the maximum, he 
should have an appropriate basis for  any reliance  he places on his as-
sessments (emphasis added). 
This guidance implies that, although the auditor may believe control risk 
is low, in order to rely  on his low assessment, he must have sufficient  evidential 
matter as a basis for  that reliance, and consequently, as a basis for  restrict-
ing substantive tests. It does NOT imply, however, that the auditor's beliefs 
about control risk are determined  only by evidential matter obtained from  tests 
of  controls. We argue that the auditor forms  expectations (i.e., beliefs)  about 
the existence of  material error in the financial  statements prior to testing. In-
deed, it is these beliefs  that form  the basis for  planning the audit, as noted 
above. The role of  evidential matter, then, is to provide a basis for  reliance 
on those beliefs.  The collection of  evidential matter which supports the au-
ditor's beliefs  contributes to the basis for  reliance, while evidential matter which 
contradicts the auditor's beliefs  reduces the basis for  reliance. In the event 
of  contradictory evidence, the auditor may reconsider whether his initial as-
sessments regarding the risk of  material error are still an accurate reflection 
of  his beliefs  and, in this respect, evidential matter may cause beliefs  to be 
revised. However, it seems unreasonable to assume that an auditor either has 
no beliefs  until competent evidential matter is collected, or that his beliefs 
are irrelevant unless sufficient  evidential matter is collected to provide a 
basis for  reliance thereon. 
Unfortunately,  the concept of  reliance was eliminated from  the professional 
standards with the issuance of  SAS 55 because of  perceived confusion  over 
its meaning [Temkin and Winters, 1988] and was replaced with guidance that 
combines risk assessments with evidence sufficiency  assessments in ways 
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that are sometimes inconsistent (i.e., equivalent control risk assessments may 
have different  meanings in different  circumstances.). The old standards em-
phasized the role of  the auditor's beliefs  in planning the audit and moving 
forward  through the various stages of  evidence collection in order to collect 
sufficient  evidential matter to provide a basis for  reliance on those beliefs. 
SAS 55, on the other hand, seems to focus  on the evidence collected as a means 
of  working backwards to "set" beliefs  about control risk. Implicitly, it also elim-
inates the requirement to assess the sufficiency  of  the evidence collected since 
control risk is "assessed" at that level that is supported by evidential matter 
(regardless of  the auditor's true beliefs).  This new focus  represents a major 
change in the basic concepts underlying the professional  standards. 
The procedure for  assessing control risk suggested by the old standards 
does not differ  from  the SAS 55 procedure in terms of  the sequence of  events 
(i.e., obtaining an understanding of  internal control structure elements, per-
forming  tests of  controls, etc.). Under our position, the old standards sug-
gest that the control risk assessment should be based on the auditor's beliefs 
and a separate assessment made regarding the sufficiency  of  the evidence 
collected to rely on those beliefs.  The next section of  the paper describes the 
use of  an "evidence-based" control risk assessment procedure and a "belief-
based" procedure (corresponding to our interpretation of  the SAS 55 proce-
dure and the procedure suggested by the old standards) in an experimental 
task setting. 
3. The Experiment 
This experiment represents a first  attempt at examining the effects  that 
procedural differences  in assessing control risk might have on auditors' con-
sensus. Due to the exploratory nature of  this experiment and the lack of  a 
theory which might predict the degree of  agreement in fact  for  each proce-
dure, we make no predictions with respect to consensus. However, the con-
ceptual differences  between the two procedures do suggest different  mean 
responses between the groups following  each procedure at various decision 
points. These are discussed shortly. 
The subject group for  this experiment consists of  64 practicing auditors 
from  "Big Six" accounting firms.  This group includes 33 seniors, 23 managers, 
two new partners, and four  experienced staff. 11 We intentionally used sub-
jects who were in at least their third busy season. It was believed that these 
subjects would be experienced enough to be comfortable  with control eval-
uation and its role in the audit process. Subjects have an average of  65 months 
of  auditing experience and have worked on an average of  24 audits in which 
they were directly involved in internal control work. The average total num-
ber of  audits worked on is 41. 
Subjects are divided into two main groups and, according to group, are 
provided with specific  instructions for  assessing control risk. Risk assessments 
(for  both groups) are based on a qualitative scale ranging from  "lowest" to 
"highest". 
11Two subjects did not indicate their experience level on their questionnaires. 
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One group, hereafter  referred  to as the "evidence-based" group, are in-
structed to assess control risk at that level that is sufficiently  supported by 
the evidence presented in the questionnaire. Consistent with the SAS 55 pro-
cedure, they are told that a control risk assessment below the highest level 
must be supported by sufficient  evidence. 
The second group, hereafter  referred  to as the "belief-based"  group, are 
instructed to assess control risk at that level that reflects  their beliefs  regarding 
the risk that a material error will not be prevented or detected by the client's 
internal control structure elements. They are further  told that their control 
risk assessment should reflect  their beliefs  regardless of  whether or not 
they feel  that sufficient  evidence exists to support those beliefs. 12 
After  reading their specific  instructions, subjects are provided with in-
formation  regarding a hypothetical client's internal control structure. This in-
cludes a description of  the company and its operations, accounting system, 
personnel, and results of  specific  tests of  controls on the previous year's 
audit. They are told that their focus  is on the valuation assertion for  gross ac-
counts receivable. Half  of  the subjects receive a description which indicates 
that the client's internal control structure with respect to this assertion is rel-
atively strong, while the other half  receive a description which indicates sig-
nificant  weaknesses in the client's internal control structure.13. In addition, 
half  of  the subjects are told that, due to cost considerations, tests of  controls 
will not be performed  on this year's audit. The other half  are told that the same 
tests of  controls performed  last year will be performed  on this year's audit. 
This design resulted in eight different  combinations of  control risk as-
sessment procedures, strength of  internal controls, and planned tests of  con-
trols (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
After  reading the description of  the client's internal control structure, sub-
jects in the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group are asked to assess control 
risk (for  the valuation assertion of  gross accounts receivable) according to 
the instructions provided in their questionnaire. Subjects in the "TESTS OF 
CONTROLS" group are asked to make a preliminary assessment of  control 
risk according to their instructions. Following this preliminary assessment, 
subjects in this group are provided with the results of  tests of  controls and 
are asked to revise their control risk assessment to reflect  this additional in-
formation,  if  necessary. 
All subjects are then asked to make an assessment of  the sufficiency  of 
the evidence provided to support their control risk assessment. Finally, all 
subjects are provided with a description of  planned substantive tests and are 
1 2In the introductory section of  the questionnaire, subjects are asked to follow  the specific  in-
structions for  assessing control risk contained in their questionnaire regardless of  how that pro-
cedure may differ  from  that used by themselves or their firm  in practice. During the pre-testing 
phase of  the experiment, however, there was considerable confusion  among the belief-based 
subjects as to whether or not their knowledge of  SAS 55 should influence  their assessments. 
For this reason, the instructions for  the belief-based  group state that their risk assessments may 
be contrary to the SAS 55 requirement to consider evidence sufficiency  in assessing control risk. 
13Pre-testing of  these descriptions was somewhat limited. Consequently, elements which were 





PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure (N = 35) 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS (a) 
n = 8 
(b) 
n = 9 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS (c) 
n = 9 
(d) 
n = 9 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure (N = 29) 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS (e) 
n = 7 
(f) 
n = 8 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS (g) 
n = 7 
00 
n = 7 
asked to recommend a sample size for  positive confirmations.  In addition, they 
are asked whether or not they would consider sending confirmations  prior 
to year-end appropriate. 
Discussion of  Possible Results 
The first  decision point at which responses can be compared is the pre-
liminary control risk assessment made by those subjects in cells a, b, e, and 
f.  Since subjects in the evidence-based group (cells a and b) should base their 
assessment on that level that is sufficiently  supported by the evidence pre-
sented up to that point, their control risk assessments should be at or near 
the highest level. At this point, tests of  controls have not yet been performed 
and consequently, there should be little justification  to reduce the control risk 
assessment from  the highest level for  either the "STRONG" or the "WEAK" 
internal control structure scenarios. 
The belief-based  group, however, should have significantly  different  pre-
liminary control risk assessments between cells e and f,  corresponding to the 
"STRONG" and "WEAK" internal control structure scenarios. Since their as-
sessments should be based on their beliefs,  regardless of  the degree of  evi-
dence to support those beliefs,  the risk assessments for  the "STRONG" 
scenario (cell e) should be significantly  lower than the risk assessments for 
the "WEAK" scenario (cell f).  The expected results for  the preliminary con-
trol risk assessments are summarized in Figure 2. 
The second point of  comparison is the control risk assessment for  sub-
jects in the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group and revised control risk as-
sessment for  subjects in the "TESTS OF CONTROLS" group. To begin, risk 
assessments for  the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using the evidence-
based procedure should exhibit the same characteristics as described above 
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Figure 2 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments: Expected Results 
PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS High High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS n/a n/a 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS n/a n/a 
for  the evidence-based preliminary control risk assessments. That is, since 
no tests of  controls are being performed,  there should be little justification 
for  a reduction in the control risk assessment for  either the "STRONG" or 
the "WEAK" internal control structure scenarios. Consequently, the con-
trol risk assessments for  both cells c and d should be at or near the high-
est level. 
The risk assessments for  the "NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using 
the belief-based  procedure should similarly correspond to the belief-based 
preliminary risk assessments described above. That is, even though tests of 
controls are not to be performed,  the belief-based  assessments for  the 
"STRONG" internal control structure scenario (cell g) should be significantly 
lower than the risk assessments for  the "WEAK" scenario (cell h). 
In the cases corresponding to "TESTS OF CONTROLS" (cells a, b, e, and 
f),  we expect to see somewhat different  results. Risk assessments for  the ev-
idence-based group should now differ  between the "STRONG" and "WEAK" 
internal control structure scenarios. Since tests of  controls have been per-
formed,  the risk assessments for  the evidence-based group in the "STRONG" 
internal control structure scenario should reflect  the fact  that evidence ex-
ists to justify  a reduction in the control risk assessment from  the highest level 
(cell a). However, the results of  tests of  controls presented in the question-
naire for  the "WEAK" internal control structure scenario indicate that two of 
the four  controls tested are not operating effectively.  Consequently, we 
shouldn't expect to see a significant  reduction in the control risk assess-
ment. That is, the evidence presented does little to justify  a reduction in the 
assessment from  the highest level for  subjects in cell b. 
The risk assessments for  the "TESTS OF CONTROLS" group using the 
belief-based  procedure (cells e and f)  should exhibit little change from  the 
preliminary risk assessments made by these subjects. The reason is that re-
sults of  tests of  controls presented in the questionnaire reveal few  "sur-
prises." Tests of  controls results for  the "STRONG" internal control structure 
scenario are relatively strong and results are weak for  the "WEAK" internal 
121 
control structure scenario. In other words, tests of  controls results should 
do little to change these subjects' preliminary beliefs. 
The expected results for  each cell for  subjects' control risk assessments 
are summarized in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
Control Risk Assessments: Expected Results 
PANEL A: Evidence-Based Procedure 
-
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS High High 
PANEL B: Belief-Based  Procedure 
INTERNAL CONTROL STRUCTURE 
STRONG WEAK 
TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
NO TESTS OF CONTROLS Low High 
All subjects are asked to make an assessment of  the sufficiency  of  the ev-
idence presented to support their control risk assessments. These assessments 
are made on a qualitative scale ranging from  "COMPLETELY INSUFFI-
CIENT" to "COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT". Since subjects in the evidence-
based group are asked to assess control risk at that level that is sufficiently 
supported by the evidence presented, their evidence sufficiency  assessments 
should all be at or very near the "COMPLETELY SUFFICIENT" level. The 
assessments made by the belief-based  group, however, should vary de-
pending upon whether or not tests of  controls have been performed.  For the 
"NO TESTS OF CONTROLS" group, we expect the evidence sufficiency  as-
sessment to be low, at or near the "COMPLETELY INSUFFICIENT" level, 
at least for  the "STRONG" internal control structure scenario. It is not clear, 
ex-ante, what the assessment should be for  the "WEAK" internal control 
structure scenario; i.e., how sufficient  must evidence be when controls are 
NOT to be relied on? For this reason, we make no prediction for  the "WEAK" 
scenario. Sufficiency  assessments for  the belief-based  group in the "TESTS 
OF CONTROLS" case should be significantly  higher than for  the "NO TESTS 
OF CONTROLS" case in the "STRONG" internal control structure scenario. 
Again, no prediction is made for  the "WEAK" case. 
The final  point of  comparison between groups is the sample size recom-
mendation for  positive confirmations.  Comparison of  responses at this point 
should provide insight into whether using different  control risk assessment 
procedures results in different  decisions with respect to substantive testing. 
Since the scenarios in cells a and e, b and f,  c and g, and d and h are pair-wise 
identical, we should not see any significant  differences  in recommended 
sample sizes between these pairs of  cells. We expect the sample sizes in cells 
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a and e to be the lowest. Furthermore, if  auditors choose higher sample sizes 
in cases where an evaluation of  a client's internal control structure reveals 
significant  weaknesses, we might expect the sample sizes in cells c and g to 
be somewhat lower than those recommended for  cells b and f,  and d and h. 
In the next section, subjects' responses are evaluated and the results are pre-
sented. In addition, some implications of  these results are discussed. 
4. Results 
In this section, we present results of  an experiment described in the 
previous section of  this paper which is intended as a first  step in the investi-
gation of  the effects  of  procedural differences  on auditors' control risk as-
sessments. While this first  step is an admittedly crude one, the results 
presented here may nevertheless provide some insight into the control risk 
assessment process and suggest possible avenues for  future,  more refined 
experiments in this area of  auditor judgment. Also, the results presented here 
are based on a limited number of  responses and consequently, the number 
of  responses for  each of  the cells shown in Figure 1 is small. For this reason, 
the usefulness  of  a statistical analysis of  the data is limited. We therefore  con-
fine  our analysis primarily to a qualitative comparison of  responses rather than 
performing  extensive statistical tests. 
In the analysis that follows,  we use the following  abbreviations to denote 
the risk assessment procedure, strength of  internal controls, and planned tests 
of  controls: 
Evidence-Based Procedure - EB 
Belief-Based  Procedure - BB 
Strong Internal Controls - STR 
Weak Internal Controls - WK 
Tests of  Controls - T 
No Tests of  Controls - NT 
The responses for  participants who used, for  example, the belief-based 
risk assessment procedure and whose questionnaires contained the strong 
internal control scenario with no tests of  controls will be denoted BB-STR-
NT. This corresponds to cell g in Figure 1. 
Subjects' control risk assessments are based on a qualitative scale rang-
ing from  "Lowest" to "Highest". In order to facilitate  comparison of  risk as-
sessments across groups, we convert these responses to a numerical value 
by letting an assessment of  "Lowest" equal "1" and "Highest" equal "5". 
(Thus a control risk assessment of  "Medium" would be given a value of  "3".) 
Similarly, subjects' assessments of  evidence sufficiency  are based on a qual-
itative scale ranging from  "Completely Insufficient"  to "Completely Suffi-
cient". These are converted to a numerical value with "1" corresponding to 
an assessment of  "Completely Insufficient"  and "5" corresponding to an as-
sessment of  "Completely Sufficient". 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments 
Subjects who completed questionnaires corresponding to cells a, b, e, and 
f  in Figure 1 were asked to make a preliminary assessment of  control risk 
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prior to reviewing the results of  tests of  controls. Table 1 presents a summary 
of  the responses for  these groups. 
Table 1 
Preliminary Control Risk Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 5.00 2.00 3.07 1.371 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 3.00 4.22 0.813 
BB-STR-T e 7 4.00 1.00 2.42 0.975 
BB-WK-T f 8 4.00 2.00 3.03 0.750 
As predicted (see Figure 2), the mean response of  3.07 for  cell a is higher 
than the mean response of  2.42 for  cell e (although a one-sided t-test of  the 
difference  was not significant;  p-value = .15). This makes sense since the re-
sponses for  the evidence-based group should reflect  the level of  control risk 
that is supported by evidence and at this point in the questionnaire, there is 
little evidential support for  a risk assessment below the highest level. How-
ever, the mean risk assessment for  the evidence-based group IS significantly 
lower than the maximum level of  "5.00" (p-value = .0027). This may suggest 
that subjects viewed some of  the information  given in the description of  the 
client's operations as providing evidence to support a lower risk assessment. 
Alternatively, it may indicate that subjects let their beliefs  influence  their risk 
assessments. Since internal controls are relatively strong, we expected the 
belief-based  group's responses to reflect  a belief  that control risk is below the 
highest level. A one-sided t-test of  the difference  between the mean response 
of  2.42 and the maximum level was significant  (p-value = .0002). 
A comparison of  the responses between cells b and f  is somewhat more 
disturbing. We expected the mean responses for  each to be high given the 
weaknesses described in the questionnaire, however the mean response of 
3.03 for  cell f  is significantly  lower than both the maximum level (p-value = 
.00) and the mean response of  4.22 for  cell b (p-value = .0072). One possible 
explanation for  this result is that our description of  weaknesses was not 
salient enough to generate an overall impression of  a weak internal control 
structure. In addition, the mean response of  4.22 for  cell b is significantly  less 
than the maximum level (p-value = .01), contrary to our expectation. The dif-
ference  between the means for  cells e and f  is marginally significant  (p-value 
= .10). Also, the difference  between mean responses for  cells a and b is 
marginally significant  (p-value = .063). 
We use the standard deviation of  responses to measure consensus for  each 
group. For the strong internal control scenario, the belief-based  group's re-
sponses exhibit a higher degree of  consensus (as evidenced by a lower stan-
dard deviation) than the responses for  the evidence-based group. Likewise, 
for  the weak scenario, the belief-based  group's responses exhibit a higher 
degree of  consensus. F-tests of  the difference  between the standard devia-
tions were not significant. 
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Control Risk Assessments 
Table 2 provides a summary of  each group's control risk assessments. For 
the groups represented by cells a, b, e and f,  these assessments represent a 
revision of  their preliminary control risk assessments (described above) 
after  reviewing results for  tests of  controls. For the remaining groups (cells 
c, d, g, and h), the control risk assessments are made after  subjects are in-
formed  that tests of  controls are not going to be performed. 
Table 2 
Control Risk Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 4.00 1.90 2.81 0.848 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 2.00 3.94 1.189 
EB-STR-NT c 9 5.00 2.00 3.47 1.030 
EB-WK-NT d 9 5.00 2.00 3.95 0.947 
BB-STR-T e 7 3.45 1.25 2.43 0.885 
BB-WK-T f 8 5.00 2.00 3.68 0.946 
BB-STR-NT g 7 4.00 1.75 2.69 0.982 
BB-WK-NT h 7 5.00 3.00 4.06 0.597 
Tests  of  Controls  Groups 
For the groups receiving tests of  controls results (cells a, b, e, and f)  we 
expected the responses for  each scenario (strong vs. weak internal controls) 
to be the same across risk assessment procedures (see Figure 3). The mean 
response of  2.81 for  cell a in Table 2 is lower than the mean response of  3.07 
for  the same group's preliminary risk assessments (cell a in Table 1). This 
is expected since after  receiving the results of  tests of  controls, subjects in 
this group had a basis for  a reduction in their control risk assessment. The 
mean response of  2.81 is significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value = .00). 
The mean response for  the belief-based  group for  the strong internal control 
scenario remained about the same. The mean preliminary assessment was 
2.42 (cell e in Table 1) and the mean revised control risk is 2.43 (cell e in Table 
2). This makes sense since the evidence presented for  tests of  controls was 
consistent with a strong internal control structure. Although the evidence-
based group's mean response of  2.81 is higher than the belief-based  group's 
mean response of  2.43, this difference  is not significant  (p-value = .41). 
The mean risk assessment for  the evidence-based group in the weak sce-
nario (cell b) decreased after  subjects reviewed tests of  controls evidence, 
from  4.22 (Table 1) to 3.94 (Table 2). For this group, we expected the pre-
liminary assessment to be high and remain high after  tests of  controls evi-
dence was presented, since the evidence presented indicated that some 
controls were not operating effectively.  However, since at least one control 
was operating effectively,  this slight reduction in control risk is not surpris-
ing. For the belief-based  group, the mean control risk assessment increased 
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3.03 (cell f  in Table 1) to 3.68 (cell f  in Table 2). This upward revision in risk 
assessments may provide an indication that if  internal controls weaknesses 
were not made salient enough in our description of  the client's operations, 
subjects would recognize that internal controls were somewhat weak after 
reviewing tests of  controls evidence. However, the mean response of  3.68 is 
still significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value = .0027). The mean re-
sponse of  3.94 for  the evidence-based group is not significantly  different  from 
the mean response of  3.68 for  the belief-based  group (p-value = .61), as ex-
pected. 
In addition, the mean response of  2.81 for  cell a is significantly  lower than 
the mean response of  3.94 for  cell b (p-value = .019). Likewise, the mean re-
sponse of  2.43 for  cell e is significantly  lower than the mean response of  3.68 
for  cell f  (p-value = .011). In general, the results for  the "Tests of  Controls" 
groups are consistent with our predictions. The mean responses for  cells a 
and e are about the same and are lower than the mean responses for  cells b 
and f,  which are also approximately equal. 
Finally, a comparison of  the standard deviations for  cells a versus e and 
b versus f  indicates that consensus is higher for  the evidence-based group 
in the strong internal control scenario and higher for  the belief-based  group 
in the weak internal control scenario, although F-tests indicate that none of 
these differences  are significant. 
No  Tests  of  Controls  Groups 
For the strong scenario case, we expected the mean responses to differ 
between the evidence-based and belief-  based groups (see Figure 3). As ex-
pected, the mean response of  3.47 for  the evidence-based group (cell c) is 
higher than the mean response of  2.69 for  the belief-based  group (cell g), al-
though this difference  is only marginally significant  (p-value = .073). We ex-
pected the mean response for  the belief-based  group to be fairly  low given 
the description of  a relatively strong internal control structure and, as expected, 
the mean response of  2.69 is significantly  lower than the maximum (p-value 
= .0004). However, the mean response of  3.47 for  the evidence-based group 
is somewhat surprising (it is significantly  lower than the maximum; p-value 
= .001). This may suggest that either: 1) subjects viewed some of  the infor-
mation given in the description of  the client's operations as tests of  controls 
evidence, 2) subjects were not able to assess control risk based solely on ev-
idence sufficiency  without being influenced  by their beliefs,  or 3) subjects 
did not understand the instructions provided for  making their control risk 
assessments. 
We expected the mean responses for  the weak scenario for  both the ev-
idence-based and belief-based  groups to be high. The mean response for  the 
evidence-based group is 3.95 (cell d) and the mean response for  the belief-
based group is 4.06 (cell h). The difference  between these means is not sig-
nificant  (p-value = .79). Again, the mean response for  the evidence-based group 
is lower than expected. Since both groups' mean responses were lower than 
the highest level, this may again suggest that we did not adequately emphasize 
weaknesses in our description of  the client's operations. Notwithstanding this, 
the mean response for  the evidence-based group is surprisingly low consid-
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ering the lack of  evidence provided, and is significantly  lower than the max-
imum (p-value = .0052). The mean response of  3.47 for  cell c is not signifi-
cantly different  from  the mean response of  3.95 for  cell d (p-value = .32), as 
expected (although both are significantly  less than the maximum, contrary 
to our expectations). The mean response of  2.69 for  cell g is significantly  lower 
than the mean response of  4.06 for  cell h (p-value = .0058), as expected. 
The standard deviations presented in Table 2 for  cells c, d, g, and h indi-
cate that consensus is higher for  the belief-based  group for  both the strong 
and weak internal control scenarios, although F-tests of  the differences  are 
not significant. 
Evidence-Sufficiency  Assessments 
Table 3 provides a summary of  responses for  each group's evidence-suf-
ficiency  assessments. 
TABLE 3 
Evidence-Sufficiency  Assessments 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 5.00 2.90 3.99 0.776 
EB-WK-T b 9 5.00 1.00 3.29 1.510 
EB-STR-NT c 9 5.00 1.00 3.39 1.318 
EB-WK-NT d 9 4.85 1.90 3.40 0.881 
BB-STR-T e 7 5.00 2.95 4.04 0.835 
BB-WK-T f 8 4.00 2.15 3.30 0.792 
BB-STR-NT g 7 4.50 2.40 3.27 0.718 
BB-STR-NT h 7 4.00 2.00 3.43 0.787 
In the instructions for  the evidence-based risk assessment procedure, sub-
jects were told that their risk assessments should correspond to that level 
that is completely supported by evidence. Consequently, we expected ex-ante 
that all of  the sufficiency  assessments for  the evidence-based groups would 
be at or near the highest level. However, as Table 3 indicates, the mean evi-
dence-sufficiency  assessments for  these groups (cells a, b, c, and d) are well 
below the maximum level. One may argue, however, that when control risk 
is assessed at the highest level, implying that controls are not to be relied 
upon, an evidence-sufficiency  assessment is not necessary. In other words, 
must we have sufficient  evidential matter to support a decision not to rely on 
controls? For the evidence-based groups which were not given tests of  con-
trols results (cells c and d), we expected control risk assessments to be at or 
near the highest level. To the extent, however, that the mean responses 
were lower than the highest level (mean responses were 3.47 for  cell c and 
3.95 for  cell d), we should expect to see high evidence-sufficiency  assessments 
since a reduction in control risk from  the highest level should be sufficiently 
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supported by evidence. However, the mean evidence-sufficiency  assessments 
corresponding to cells c and d are 3.39 and 3.40, respectively. Both are sig-
nificantly  lower than the maximum (p-values = .0032 and .00 for  cells c and 
d, respectively). 
For the evidence-based groups who received tests of  controls evidence 
such that we might expect a lower-than- maximum control risk assessment 
(cells a and b) based on this evidence, the mean evidence-sufficiency  as-
sessments were also lower than the maximum (3.99 for  cell a and 3.29 for 
cell b). T-tests of  the differences  between these cells and the maximum level 
resulted in p-values of  .004 and .0048 for  cells a and b, respectively. These re-
sults suggest that the risk assessments made by the evidence-based groups 
do not reflect  the level that is sufficiently  supported by evidential matter. Al-
ternatively, it is possible that subjects did not understand the instructions given 
for  assessing control risk or that the procedure itself,  no matter how thor-
oughly explained, is confusing. 
We conducted t-tests of  the difference  in mean responses between cells 
a and e, cells b and f,  cells c and g, and cells d and h, all of  which yielded in-
significant  results (the p-values were .92, .99, .41 and .53, respectively). In ad-
dition, a comparison of  standard deviations between the same sets of  cells 
indicate that in all but one case, consensus is higher for  the belief-based  groups. 
F-tests of  the differences  in standard deviations were marginally significant 
(at level .10) for  cells b vs f  and cells c vs g. 
Sample Size Recommendations 
After  making their control risk assessments and evidence-sufficiency  as-
sessments, subjects in all groups were asked to recommend a sample size 
for  positive confirmations.  A summary of  these responses is provided in 
Table 4 below. 
Table 4 
Sample Size Recommendations 
Group Cell 
Number of 
Responses High Low Mean St. Dev 
EB-STR-T a 8 70 20 35 17.32 
EB-WK-T b 8 125 25 63 35.70 
EB-STR-NT c 9 70 15 38 17.47 
EB-WK-NT d 9 75 30 51 15.70 
BB-STR-T e 7 100 20 57 27.70 
BB-WK-T f 8 120 25 48 30.90 
BB-STR-NT g 7 100 20 56 28.60 
BB-WK-NT h 7 60 16 40 15.28 
We included the sample size recommendation task in the experiment in 
an attempt to gain some insight into whether or not the use of  alternative con-
trol risk assessment procedures has an effect  on auditors' subsequent deci-
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sions. The results in Table 4 indicate that not only are there no clear systematic 
differences  between the evidence-based and belief-based  groups, but there 
also appears to be no clear differences  between strong and weak internal con-
trol cases and tests of  controls versus no tests of  controls cases. Responses 
for  this task were highly variable and, as a result, do not provide a great deal 
of  insight. 
These results are consistent with prior studies which found  subjects' 
planning decisions subsequent to internal control judgments highly variable 
[see, for  example, Gaumnitz, Nunamaker, Surdick, and Thomas, 1982, and 
Tabor, 1983]. This variability may be due to different  philosophies between 
audit firms  with respect to substantive test planning. Consequently, these re-
sults are not surprising. However, since one might argue that differences  in 
control risk assessment procedures would have the greatest impact on the 
audit process if  they affected  auditors' subsequent decisions, this is an area 
that warrants further  investigation. A more refined  research approach may 
provide the insight that our design failed  to provide with respect to sample 
size decisions for  substantive tests. 
Timing of  Tests 
In addition to providing a sample size recommendation for  positive con-
firmations,  subjects were also asked whether they would consider sending 
confirmations  prior to year-end appropriate. The results are presented in Table 
5 below. 
Table 5 




Prior to Year-End Appropriate? 
Yes No 
EB-STR-T a 8 5 3 
EB-WK-T b 9 3 6 
EB-STR-NT c 9 3 6 
EB-WK-NT d 9 0 9 
BB-STR-T e 7 6 1 
BB-WK-T f 8 1 7 
BB-STR-NT g 7 2 5 
BB-WK-NT h 7 3 4 
These results do not indicate any systematic differences  between the ev-
idence-based and belief-based  groups with respect to the timing decision. For 
the most part, subjects' responses indicated that sending confirmations  prior 
to year-end is appropriate when internal controls are strong and tests of  con-
trols have been performed.  Thus, the control risk assessment procedure 
does not appear to affect  auditors' timing decisions. 
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5. Conclusion 
In 1988, Statement on Auditing Standards Number 55 was issued by the 
AICPA as a replacement standard for  AU Section 320 in an attempt to improve 
auditors' internal control evaluations and sharpen auditors' control risk as-
sessments. In this paper, we described what we view as significant  differences 
in the basic concepts underlying the old and new standards. 
In particular, the old standards suggested a separation of  1) a control risk 
assessment based on the auditor's beliefs  and 2) an assessment of  the suffi-
ciency of  evidence to support those beliefs.  SAS 55, on the other hand, sug-
gests combining these two assessments into one control risk assessment such 
that the assessed level of  control risk is that level that is sufficiently  supported 
by evidential matter. 
We presented results for  an experiment in which subjects were asked to 
assess control risk following  one of  two risk assessment procedures based 
on the two approaches described above. While the number of  responses eval-
uated is relatively small, the results provide some interesting insights into 
the control risk assessment process. While there was no clear "winner" in 
terms of  consensus for  the various judgments made by subjects, responses 
nevertheless seem to indicate a "procedural" effect. 
In particular, assessments made with respect to evidence sufficiency  for 
subjects following  the "evidence-based" control risk procedure were much 
lower than expected. Since this group's risk assessments should have cor-
responded to that level that subjects felt  was sufficiently  supported by evi-
dence, we expected evidence-sufficiency  assessments for  this group to be high. 
These results may have been due to weaknesses in the questionnaire or, al-
ternatively, may suggest that the approach of  combining risk and evidence-
sufficiency  assessments is confusing. 
This paper was intended as a rough first  step in the investigation of  the ef-
fects  of  using alternative procedures to assess control risk. Future experiments 
would likely add valuable insight into these effects  through refinements  in sub-
ject training, case descriptions, and experimental design with respect to sub-
stantive testing decisions. Other factors  which may have significant  impact 
on the control risk assessment process and subsequent audit decisions which 
were not addressed in this paper include making separate versus combined 
assessments of  inherent risk and control risk [Waller, 1990] and decompos-
ing control risk assessments into separate evaluations of  internal control de-
sign effectiveness  and operating effectiveness  [Morton and Felix, 1990]. 
Results presented in this paper are admittedly preliminary in nature and 
consequently, no general conclusions can be drawn. However, it is clear that 
there is no dearth of  opportunities for  expanding our knowledge and insight 
into this most intriguing area of  auditor judgment. 
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